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MR. SODERBERGH GOES TO WASHINGTON:
HOW CONGRESS AND THE CLEAN FLICKS
COURT CREATED MORAL RIGHTS FOR
FILMMAKERS
I. INTRODUCTION
The right of copyright holders to enjoy an economic monopoly
on their creative works has often been in opposition with the
purpose of copyright to promote social good by the dissemination
of creative works.1 The artists' social and moral values, however,
can conflict with those of the public, who wish to enjoy the artists'
work.' Because the purpose of copyright is ultimately to promote
dissemination of expression for the greater social good, it seems
logical that any alterations in the work that would result in a
greater dissemination of the work would be in society's best
interests. This was the viewpoint of the plaintiffs in the case of
Clean Flicks of Colorado v. Soderbergh, where the collection of
plaintiff video companies created unauthorized derivative works
yet still paid the requisite royalties for each unauthorized copy
created.
In Clean Flicks of Colorado v. Soderbergh, the District Court of
Colorado found that the creators of the unauthorized works had
violated the rights of the lawful copyright holders.' Part II of this
paper will focus on the background and circumstances that gave
rise to the infringement action and the positions of the parties
1. SHELDON W. HALPERN, COPYRIGHT LAW: PROTECTION OF ORIGINAL
EXPRESSION 4 (2002).
2. The Copyright Clause grants Congress the power "to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
3. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (D.
Colo. 2006).
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involved, with a particular focus on the rights of the copyright
holders under U.S. statute and the defenses raised by the plaintiffs.
Part III will look at the court's analysis, specifically the strengths
and weaknesses of the court's holding that the plaintiffs were
liable for copyright infringement. Of particular importance was
the court's opinion that the newly implemented Family
Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005 (FECA) was irrelevant
to the proceedings. Part IV analyzes why the court was incorrect
in its analysis and how Congress, in passing the FECA, created an
implied moral right of integrity for filmmakers. This implied right
could possibly extend far beyond the finite economic rights
provided for in the Copyright Act, thereby violating the framers'
intent behind the Constitutional grant of copyright.'
This article proposes that Congress exceeded its Constitutional
grant of powers by creating new moral rights for copyright owners.
Therefore, the court erred in its recognition of these new moral
rights through its opinion that the plaintiffs were guilty of
copyright infringement. Coupling these new moral rights with the
court's flawed fair use analysis, this decision will have a chilling
effect on the rights of the purchasers of copyrighted material, even
though the court stopped just short of allowing the filmmakers to
control their product even after the authorized copy has been
distributed.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Clean Flicks of Colorado v. Soderbergh
The case of Clean Flicks of Colorado v. Soderbergh commenced
when the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment on the issue of
whether their use of the defendants' works infringed upon the
defendants' copyrights.' The plaintiffs in Clean Flicks
(CleanFlicks) were various video retail stores and commercial
entities that generated revenue by creating and distributing edited
versions of existing films.6  CleanFlicks created these edited
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1237.
6. Id. at 1238.
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versions by altering films through deletion of "sex, nudity,
profanity, and gory violence."' CleanFlicks claimed that their
production and sale of the edited films was for the purpose of
criticizing the objectionable sexual and violent content that they
deemed to be prevalent in modem films and providing "more
socially acceptable alternatives" for families who wish to view the
films without the objectionable content.8 CleanFlicks obtained
unedited copies by purchasing them from authorized retailers and
it would then sell these legally obtained copies to the public after
editing out the objectionable content.9
In order to create an edited version of a film, CleanFlicks
obtained an original copy of the film either by purchasing the film
from an authorized retailer or from a customer who owned an
original copy. Using the original copy as a template,
CleanFlicks, having first disabled the copy's native digital content
protection system, would digitally copy the entire film onto a
CleanFlicks computer hard drive." The digital protection systems
present on most original copies of copyrighted digital video discs
(DVDs) consists of software embedded within the DVD's code
that scrambles the code in a way that prevented any unauthorized
copying of the DVD. 2 CleanFlicks would then run the entire film
through a digital editing software suite that allowed the operator to
edit films specifically for content." These edits included, but were
not limited to, deletions of audio and video portions of the films,
redaction of audio portions, replacement of the redaction with
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1240.
9. Id. at 1238.
10. Id.
11. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
12. Id. The protection systems are based upon a framework called Content
Protection System Architecture (CPSA). CPSA consists of 11 axioms that
define standards that providers can use to regulate access and recording controls
for protected content. CPSA incorporates 2 mechanisms of content-protection:
1) watermarking, where content-protection information is embedded directly
into an audio or video stream, and 2) encryption, where the content is scrambled
until it is decrypted by a CPSA-compliant device. Don Labriola, Digital
Content Protection, PC MAGAZINE, May 16, 2002, available at
http://www.baselinemag.com/printarticle2/0,2533,a=27038,00.asp.
13. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
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other audio noise, manipulation of the content in order to provide
seamless transition of edited scenes with unedited scenes, and the
use of visual effects, such as cropping, black bars, or fogging
effects, in order to obscure objectionable visual content.' "
Upon completion of the editing, CleanFlicks would download a
completely edited copy from the computer and use this copy to
create a new recordable DVD for sale to the public directly or for
sale indirectly through another retailer. 5 All of the DVD copies of
the edited films created by CleanFlicks bore the CleanFlicks
trademark. 6  Customers who wished to purchase edited films
would either pay CleanFlicks the retail price of an unedited
version or provide CleanFlicks with a new, unedited version
purchased from another authorized retailer. 7 The end result of
these transactions was that the customer had paid for a new,
unedited copy. 8 Once CleanFlicks received the unedited copy or
payment for an unedited copy, it would then, for an additional fee
paid by the customer, provide the customer with an edited version
of the same film."' CleanFlicks retained ownership of the unedited
copy while the customer retained ownership of the edited copy.2"
At all times, CleanFlicks maintained a one-to-one inventory
ratio of the unedited versions to the edited copies it rented or sold
to its members with the belief that the maintenance of such an
inventory was in compliance with the Copyright Act's First Sale
Doctrine.2' CleanFlicks used the same unedited-for-edit
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
20. Id. at 1238-39.
21. Id. at 1239. Under the Copyright Act's First Sale Doctrine:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular
copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by
such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord." 17 U.S.C. §
109(a) (2006). CleanFlicks believed that maintaining a ratio of one unedited
copy for each edited copy sold was in compliance with the First Sale doctrine
because they believed that the copyright holder's rights in the unedited copy
were extinguished with regard to that single copy at the time of sale; therefore,
CleanFlicks believed that their use of the unedited copy to make a single edited
4
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/5
2007] MR. SODERBERGH GOES TO WASHINGTON 343
sale/exchange mechanism in providing edited films to other
retailers. 2 Furthermore, CleanFlicks refused to sell its edited films
to retailers who made unauthorized copies of CleanFlicks' edited
films. 2 3  CleanFlicks did not view its actions as copyright
infringement because CleanFlicks believed that the creation of
edited copies of the films represented a fair use of the films and the
creation of the edited films from the original works was protected
under the first sale doctrine.24
The defendants in Clean Flicks (the filmmakers) were
filmmakers and film distributors of films protected under
copyright law, and they were the rightful copyright holders of the
films edited by CleanFlicks.2 ' According to § 106 of the
Copyright Act, holders of valid copyrights are entitled to certain
rights: (1) the right to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies;
(2) the right to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted works; and (3) the right to distribute copies... to the
public by sale or by other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
leasing, or lending.26 Although the filmmakers directly distributed
their films to consumers in unedited versions, the filmmakers also
created edited versions of their films where the films would be
distributed via other media such as network and syndicated
copy for sale to the public was allowable within the scope of the First Sale
Doctrine. See Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
22. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1239-42.
25. Id. at 1238.
26. Id. These rights are part of the exclusive rights granted to copyright
holders under the Copyright Act. Specifically, the Act provides the copyright
holder with the exclusive rights:
1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords 2) to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted works, 3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of
the copyrighted work to the public by sale or by other transfer
of ownership, or by rental, leasing or lending; 4) in the case of
•.. motion pictures . . . to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; 5) in the case of . . . the individual images of a
motion picture... to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). In Clean Flicks, only the rights to create and
distribute derivative works are at issue.
5
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television." All of the edits were made in order to conform to
established criteria such as ratings, network standards, and
practices, formatting, and run time.28 The filmmakers never sold
or otherwise directly distributed these edited versions to
consumers.
29
Knowing that the filmmakers planned to bring suit against them
for copyright infringement, CleanFlicks peremptorily brought suit
against the filmmakers.3 °  CleanFlicks sought a declaratory
judgment stating that CleanFlicks' creation and sale of edited
versions of the filmmakers' films did not constitute copyright
infringement.3' The filmmakers responded by filing a
counterclaim in which the filmmakers accused CleanFlicks of
copyright infringement.32 The filmmakers claimed that under the
Copyright Act the creation of these edited copies violated the
filmmakers' exclusive rights to reproduce their own copyrighted
films, distribute copies of their films to consumers by sale or
rental, and create derivative works.3 CleanFlicks did not view its
actions as commensurate with copyright infringement and
defended their actions by asserting that the creation of edited
copies of the films represented a fair use of the films and the
creation of the edited films from the original works was protected
under the first sale doctrine.34
B. Constitutional and Statutory Copyright Protection in the
United States
The United States Constitution expressly grants Congress the
power to create federal copyright law.35 The Copyright Act grants
copyright owners a monopoly for a limited time over the exercise
of certain exclusive rights to reward individuals for creative
27. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1239.
31. Id. at 1236.
32. Id. at 1237.
33. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
34. Id. at 1239-42.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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endeavors that promote social progress.36  Under the 1976
Copyright Act (the Act), copyright protection vests with the owner
from the moment of creation of the copyrighted work.37 The Act
lists various works that are eligible for copyright protection,
including motion pictures. 38  The Act grants owners of motion
picture copyrights a limited monopoly over exploitation of their
works for a maximum statutory period of ninety-five years
following the copyright grant for works created prior to January 1,
1978 implementation date of the Act.39  For works created
following the implementation of the 1976 Copyright Act, the term
of protection is either the life of the author and 70 years after the
author's death, where the author is the sole author or a joint author
of the copyright, or 95 years from the date of first publication or
120 years from the year of its creation, in the case of the work
being a work made for hire, an anonymous work, or a
pseudonymous work.4"
The Act also provides certain enumerated exclusive rights for
the copyright holders. Motion picture copyright holders have the
rights to: (1) make reproductions of films for distribution; (2)
prepare derivative works such as sequels, based on the original
films; (3) distribute copies of copyrighted films by selling or
renting them to the public; (4) publicly display and perform the
films; and (5) publicly display individual images from copyrighted
film.4 Derivative works include any works based on a preexisting
copyrighted work. A film sequel, therefore, would be considered a
derivative work based on the original copyrighted film.4" For
example, because Sylvester Stallone and MGM/UA are the
exclusive copyright holders for the rights to the film "Rocky," they
would be the only parties under the Act with the exclusive rights to
make derivative works based on "Rocky," including film sequels.4 3
36. ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 212
(Robert C. Clark ed., Foundation Press 2d ed. 2004).
37. Id. at213.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
39. Id. § 304(b).
40. Id. § 302(a)-(c).
41. Id. § 106.
42. Id. § 101.
43. Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
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In 2005, Congress amended § 110 of Copyright Act with the
passage of FECA." One of the goals of FECA was to permit
individual owners of copies of films to legally alter the content of
their individual copies without running afoul of the Copyright
Act's prohibition on the unauthorized creation of derivative
works.45 The langauge of FECA accomplished this goal by
narrowly defining the use permitted. Individual owners can only
personally edit out content from their own copies.46 Furthermore,
this editing is only allowed if no fixed copies of the altered works
are created.47
C. Defensible Uses of Copyrighted Works
1. The Fair Use Defense
Although copyright owners retain a limited monopoly in
exploitation of their works, there are exceptions and limitations to
the extent of this monopoly. These limitations are part of
Congress' efforts to balance the promotion of the public welfare
44. See H.R. REP. No. 109-33(l) (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
220.
45. Id. at 5, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 224. As one of the purposes underlying
the FECA, the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of
Representatives stated that United States copyright law: "should not be used to
limit a parent's right to control what their children watch in the privacy of their
own home." Id., 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 224.
46. Id.
47. Id. This provision of the FECA, codified in the Copyright Act, permits:
the making imperceptible, by or at the direction of a member
of a private household, of limited portions of audio or video
content of a motion picture, during a performance in or
transmitted to that household for private home viewing, from
an authorized copy of the motion picture, or the creation or
provision of a computer program or other technology that
enables such making imperceptible and that is designed and
marketed to be used, a the direction of a member of a private
household, for such making imperceptible, if no fixed copy of
the altered version of the motion picture is created by such
computer program or other technology.
17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2006).
346
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and the protection of copyright holders' property rights.48 Under
the Act's provisions, courts must examine four factors in order to
determine whether the use of a work in a particular instance
satisfies the statutory requirements of fair use.
a. Purpose and Character of the Use
The first factor is "the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes."49 This factor examines whether
or not the alleged infringer was using the works for monetary gain
rather than for other more altruistic reasons." Under the statutory
affirmative defense of fair use, the use of copyrighted work for
purposes such as commentary, teaching, news reporting,
scholarship, or research would not be considered an infringing use
of the work. The fair use doctrine satisfies Congress' mandate to
promote the general public welfare because it allows the use of
copyrighted work where forced payment for the use of the work
might stifle public comment, criticism, or scholarly pursuits. 2 The
Supreme Court has held that when the use of a work provides such
a social benefit, the unauthorized use could be considered statutory
fair use under § 107."3
b. Examination of the Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor of the fair use defemse depends on the "nature
48. DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 36, at 411.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
50. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
52. DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 36, at 411.
53. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. In Campbell, the Supreme Court held that 2
Live Crew's unauthorized use of Roy Orbison's song, "Oh Pretty Woman" in a
parody rap version of the song was considered permissible under the fair use
doctrine because the transformative nature of the parody provided "social
benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creat[ed] a
new [work]." Id. The court reasoned that, because the rap song could be
perceived as commenting on and criticizing the original work in the form of
parody, the use was permissively fair. Id.
347
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of the copyrighted work. 5 4 Creative works are afforded more
protection than factual works because creative works more easily
satisfy the two pronged requirements for originality under the
Copyright Act: (1) independent creation of the work by the author
rather than copying from other works; and (2) a modicum of
creativity.5 The status of the work as published or unpublished is
also critical. If the work is unpublished, the permissible scope is
narrower because "the right of first publication encompasses not
only the choice whether to publish at all, but also the choices of
when, where, and in what form first to publish."56  Therefore,
works that satisfy the requirements of originality and that are
unpublished would engender more copyright protection than a
collection of published facts. 7
54. 17 U.S.C § 107.
55. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). In Fiest,
the Supreme Court first considered the minimum requirements for a grant of
U.S. copyright. The plaintiff telephone company brought suit against the
defendant telephone directory publisher, arguing that the defendant's
appropriation of the plaintiffs utility listings was a violation of the plaintiffs
copyright. Id. at 340. The Court held that, because the plaintiff's directory was
not entitled to a copyright, the defendant's use of the plaintiffs directory was
not copyright infringement. Id. The Court reasoned that collections of facts do
not contain the requisite authorship and creativity that are required for a grant of
copyright. Id. at 361-62. The court concluded that, although compilations of
facts are copyrightable, they are not copyrightable per se; they are only
copyrightable if its facts have been "selected, coordinated, or arranged in such
way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship." Id. at 356-57 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1990)).
56. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564
(1985). In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court first considered the balancing of
First Amendment rights and copyrights. The plaintiff publisher sued the
defendant magazine publisher for unauthorized publication of the previously
unpublished memoirs of President Ford, the rights to which were held by the
plaintiff. Id. at 543. The Court held that the defendant's use of the copyrighted
work was not fair use; although the quotes appropriated represented a small
portion of the work, the court concluded that the quotes amounted to the "heart
of the book." Id. at 565. The court further held that the defendant's use of the
work was in bad faith because the intended purpose of the pre-publication was
to supplant the copyright holders' right of first publication. Id. at 562.
57. See id. at 564.
348
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c. Amount and Substantiality of Portion Used
The third factor of the fair use determination is the "amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole."58 Courts are less inclined to find fair use where
the alleged infringers appropriate large or substantial portions of
copyrighted works.59 In addition to the quantity used, this factor
also requires a consideration of the "quality and the value of the
materials used."6 In its fair use analysis, the Supreme Court has
coupled this factor with the first factor because the extent of
permissible copying under factor one varies with the "purpose and
character of the use" under factor two.6" For example, if a
significant portion of a copyrighted song is used in a commercial
parody, the Court might consider such use statutory fair use
notwithstanding the parody's substantial appropriation of the heart
of the original work because the purpose and nature of the use was
to provide commercial criticism in the form of parody.6"
d. Effect Use on Potential Market or Value of Copyrighted
Work
The final factor of the fair use determination is "the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work."63 Congress intended that the exclusive limited monopoly
granted to copyright holders would reward creators for their hard
work and creativity.'M This fair use factor considers the harm on
the market by dissemination of the original work, the
accompanying losses incurred by the copyright holder as a result
of the infringement, the market for derivative works, and the future
potential markets that the copyright holder might wish to protect.65
58. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
59. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587-88 (1994).
60. Id. at 586.
61. Id. at 586-87.
62. Id. at 588. Under Campbell, "[c]opying does not become excessive in
relation to parodic purpose merely because the portion taken was the original's
heart." Id.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
64. DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 36 at 212-13.
65. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. The Copyright Act defines a "derivative
349
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Although courts have found a presumption of harm where the
alleged fair use was for commercial gain, this presumption has not
held where the purpose and nature of the use was for criticism or
where the work has been so transformed as to not become a market
substitution for the original work.66 Transformative works are
those that add "something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the [original work] with new expression,
meaning, or message."67  For example, when a video store
infringes upon the rights of a film's copyright holder for the
purpose of commercial gain, there is a presumption that the
infringer's actions significantly harmed the market for the lawful
copyright holder's creation. Where the potentially infringing
material is transformative, however, such as in the case of a
commercial song parody, the presumption market substitution is
less certain, because a parody does not serve as a market
substitution that would diminish the public's desire for the original
work.68
2. Right of First Sale
Under the first sale doctrine, the owner of a particular authorized
copy has the right to sell or transfer ownership of that particular
work" as:
work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or
other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original
work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
17 U.S.C. § 101.
66. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
67. Id. at 579.
68. Id. at 591. The Supreme Court stated:
[A]s to parody pure and simple, it is more likely that the new
work will not affect the market for the original in a way
cognizable under this factor, that is, by acting as a substitute
for it .... This is so because the parody and the original
usually serve different market functions.
350
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copy without the authority of the copyright holder.69 Therefore,
the doctrine permits the sale of a copy of a copyrighted work
without transferring complete ownership of the work's underlying
copyright." For example, a consumer who has purchased a DVD
from a commercial entity has the right to resell the DVD without
paying a further royalty to the DVD's copyright owner, but this
right is limited to the individual copy. The consumer cannot make
copies of the original and sell them, as this would be a violation of
the copyright holder's rights under the Copyright Act.7
III. SUBJECT OPINION
In its analysis, the District Court for Colorado carefully
considered the statutory language of the Act in its determination of
whether CleanFlicks had infringed upon the filmmakers'
copyrights. The court found that CleanFlicks' unauthorized
reproduction and distribution of the filmmakers' copyrighted work
violated the filmmakers' exclusive rights to make "fixed copies" of
their works and distribute their works.72
A. The Fair Use Defense
CleanFlicks raised the statutory affirmative defense of fair use,
as provided for in the Act, as a justification for editing and
distributing the filmmakers' copyrighted works. 73  The court
69. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
70. Scholarly Communication Center of the NCSU Libraries,
http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/scc/tutorial/copyuse/copybas3.html (last visited Nov. 1,
2007).
71. 17U.S.C. § 106.
72. Id.
73. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1239
(D. Colo. 2006). Section 107 provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the
fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors
13
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examined whether CleanFlicks met their burden of proof for the
fair use defense using the Supreme Court's analytical framework
from Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.7 4
Under the first factor, the "purpose and character of use,"
CleanFlicks argued that although their use of the works was for
commercial gain, this single factor was not dispositive in finding
that the use was not fair.75 Although CleanFlicks used the works
for the purpose of commercial gain, CleanFlicks argued that they
also wanted to "establish a public policy test" by "criticizing
objectionable [materials]" in motion pictures and establishing the
rights of the owners of copies of films to remove such content in
order to protect children from the "presumed harmful effects" that
this content might engender.76 Although CleanFlicks never
described their public policy test or the means for its
implementation to the court, CleanFlicks relied on the Supreme
Court decision of Chicago Board of Education v. Substance, Inc.
as source authority for the test's applicability in the current case.77
In Chicago Board of Education, the Court held that
unauthorized use was deemed to be fair use when the infringer
used only so much as necessary for effective criticism of the works
in question.7 ' The District Court of Colorado found that such
social value arguments were "inconsequential to copyright law"
because the federal courts primary concern was to protect the
"creator's rights to protect its creation in the form which it was
created.
79
The court then addressed whether CleanFlicks' edited films
to be considered shall include: (1) the purpose and character
of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature
of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. §107 (2006).
74. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Chi. Bd. ofEduc. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003).
79. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
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were transformative in nature.8" The filmmakers claimed that
CleanFlicks' creation of the edited films violated the filmmakers'
exclusive right to create derivative works. CleanFlicks, however,
denied that their edited DVDs and videos were derivative works as
defined under the Act.8' As part of its analysis, the court used the
Supreme Court's definition of transformative works. Works are
transformative if the use "adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning or message."82  Under this definition, the
court found that CleanFlicks' use was not transformative, because
the edits comprised only a very small fraction of the total running
time of the motion picture.83 Therefore, the edited versions did not
satisfy the definition of transformative works, and the first
statutory factor of the fair use defense was not satisfied. 4
The court next found that the second statutory fair use factor,
"the nature of the copyrighted work," weighed against
CleanFlicks. The films were expressive works that were entitled
to the highest level of copyright protection. Furthermore, the
court concluded that CleanFlicks' use was not transformative.86
Although CleanFlicks' editing of the films had altered some of the
substantively expressive portions of the works, the court found that
the amount of the work transformed never rose to the level of a
new and distinctive work. 7
The court then concluded that the minimal alterations in the
original work weighed against a finding of fair use under the third
fair use factor, "the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole."88 Although the
films were edited from their primary form, CleanFlicks copied
80. Id. at 1241.
81. Id. Section 106 of the Copyright Act gives the owner of a copyright the
exclusive right to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2) (2006).
82. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241.
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substantial portions of the whole of the copyrighted works.89
Under the fourth statutory factor of the fair use defense, "the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work," CleanFlicks argued that their activities did not
harm the market for the filmmakers' original works because the
filmmakers benefited from original copy sales for every edited
copy sold which was also a different target market from that of
CleanFlicks. 9  The court was unconvinced by CleanFlicks'
arguments. Instead, it reasoned that the "intrinsic value of the
right to control the content of the copyrighted work [is] the essence
of the law of copyright."' The court relied on the Supreme
Court's understanding that the fair use defense is "predicated on a
theory of an author's implied consent to reasonable and customary
use when he releases his work for public consumption."92 Because
CleanFlicks exploited a market different from the filmmakers'
target market, the implied consent theory of fair use was not
applicable. 93 The use would not have been considered "reasonable
and customary," even if the target market had been the same,
because the appropriation was not for the purposes of scholarship
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1241-42.
91. Id. at 1242.
92. Id. (quoting Harper &Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 550 (1985)). Here, the court, citing to Harper & Row, noted the difference
between the use of the copyrighted material for the purpose of acceptable fair
use, such as criticism, versus CleanFlicks' use of the material in a manner that
supplanted the original work, thereby harming the market for the original work.
The Clean Flicks court's reliance on the Harper & Row opinion was based, in
turn, on the Supreme Court's reliance on the Folsom v. Marsh opinion, where
Justice Story wrote:
[A] reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work, if
his design be really and truly to use the passages for the
purposes of fair and reasonable criticism. On the other hand,
it is clear, that if he thus cites the most important parts of the
work, with a view, not to criticise, but to supersede the use of
the original work, and substitute the review for it, such use
will be deemed in law a piracy.
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550 (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45
(C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)).
93. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1242.
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or criticism.94 Under the Copyright Act, the filmmakers retained
the sole right to distribute their works to their chosen markets.95
The court concluded that when CleanFlicks offered the
filmmakers' works to an audience that was not the filmmakers'
target, CleanFlicks violated the filmmakers' exclusive distribution
rights.96 The edited films might also have harmed the potential
future market for the filmmakers' original works, because the
edited and unedited versions were similar to the point where
CleanFlicks' versions could serve as market substitutions for the
filmmakers' works.97 Therefore, the filmmakers would not enjoy
maximum income because of sales lost due to the presence of
CleanFlicks' films in the market.98
B. The First Sale Doctrine
In addition to the fair use defense, CleanFlicks also raised the
first sale doctrine as a defense to the filmmakers' claims of
infringement.99 By reasoning that the first sale doctrine applied
solely to alienation of copies of works legally acquired from the
copyright holder, the court held that the doctrine was irrelevant to
the case."'0 The filmmakers sought to halt the distribution of
infringing, edited copies of their works to the public and not the
resale of the filmmakers' works legally purchased by CleanFlicks;
therefore, the first sale doctrine was inapplicable."0 '
IV. ANALYSIS
In Clean Flicks, the District Court of Colorado erred in its
analysis of both established copyright law as well as its
94. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539.
95. As one of their exclusive rights under the Copyright Act, copyright
owners have the right to "distribute copies or phonorecords.of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending." 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006).
96. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1242.
97. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994).
98. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1242.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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understanding of FECA. In holding that CleanFlicks violated the
filmmakers' rights with regard to exclusive control of distribution
and reproduction of copyrighted motion pictures, the court
ignored: (1) the central foundations underlying copyright law; (2)
Congress' intent behind FECA; and (3) the proper tests for
determining the threshold for fair use of copyrighted materials.
A. Federal Copyright and the Reasons for Constitutional
Copyright Protection
Although the primary purpose of copyright is to secure "the
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors,"
the author benefits by the limited economic monopoly for the
exploitation of the work.112 In Clean Flicks, the filmmakers argued
that CleanFlicks unfairly infringed on the filmmakers' copyrights,
but the filmmakers were unable to demonstrate any real harm that
resulted from CleanFlicks' activities. 10 3  First, in requiring
customers to purchase authorized, unedited copies from the
filmmakers, the filmmakers reaped the benefits of the royalties
from those sales. This income might never have been realized
without the actions of CleanFlicks.0 4 A second consideration is
that if statutory copyright protection is intended to reward the
copyright holders economically, the actions of CleanFlicks served
the purposes of such protection, because the filmmakers reaped
large benefits from CleanFlicks' infringement. CleanFlicks
demonstrated that the purchasers of the edited films would not
normally have been exposed to the filmmakers' works for fear of
exposing the purchasers' children and family members to scenes of
objectionable content."0 5 By providing the edited motion pictures,
CleanFlicks exposed the purchasers of such films to the
filmmakers' products, thereby expanding the consumer base for
102. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
1.03[A] (2007) [hereinafter NIMMER] (citing New York Times v. Tasini, 533
U.S. 483, 519 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
103. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
104. See id. at 1236.
105. See id. at 1240 ("The accused parties . . . have submitted many
communications from viewers expressing their appreciation for the opportunity
to view movies in the setting of the family home without concern for any
harmful effects on the children.").
18
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/5
2007] MR. SODERBERGH GOES TO WASHINGTON 357
the films beyond that which was targeted by the filmmakers
themselves. In this way, CleanFlicks actually enhanced the value
of the filmmakers' copyrights. Rather than focusing on the
framers' intent in including copyright protection in the
Constitution, the Clean Flicks court opined that copyright exists
for existence's sake. That is, the court felt that the "intrinsic value
of the right to control" copyrighted content, and not the monetary
reward to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," was
the true "essence" of copyright law. °6
The filmmakers might have had a successful argument if the
CleanFlicks copies were in direct competition with those of the
filmmakers within the same market, but the filmmakers offered up
no such evidence. CleanFlicks expended capital on marketing,
duplication, and customer service without any financial assistance
from the filmmakers, and yet the filmmakers realized large
financial gains without any extra effort.
Further, by maintaining the one-to-one ratio of edited to
unedited versions, CleanFlicks satisfied the framers' intent,
because the filmmakers were rewarded for their intellectual
property rights from the royalties gleaned from the sales of the
unedited films. In justifying its position against this reasoning, the
Clean Flicks court stated that the value of the filmmakers'
copyrights was diminished because the edited films reached an
audience that the filmmakers never "sought to reach."10 7  A
counterargument is that as representatives of publicly-traded
companies, the filmmakers owe a duty to their stockholders to
enhance the return on the value of the copyright through the widest
possible dissemination of their works. The Clean Flicks court's
argument with respect to the loss of property value on the part of
the filmmakers is, therefore, unconvincing.
B. Interpreting FECA
Although the Clean Flicks court acknowledged the passage of
the FECA, the court's analysis of the Congressional intent behind
the passage of the FECA was flawed. °8 In its opinion, the Clean
106. Id. at 1242.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1240.
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Flicks court stated that the legislative history "show[ed] that the
amendment was not intended to exempt actions resulting in fixed
copies of altered works which the House Committee believed
illegal."'' 9 A careful analysis of the legislative history, however,
reveals that the goal of FECA was to empower viewers to "make
imperceptible" segments of films that viewers might find
objectionable.' In their report on FECA, the Judiciary
Committee, while noting that making fixed copies of altered works
is illegal under copyright law, also refused to differentiate between
companies that provide editing service for profit versus those that
provide such service not-for-profit."' The intent, however, was to
prevent the sale of illegal copies of films and to curb piracy.
Congress did not enact FECA with the intent to stop lawful owners
of legitimately-obtained film copies from making the edits they
might deem necessary. 2 The "fixed copy" restriction that the
Clean Flicks court focused on is too limited in its meaning to have
lasting effects in the face of emerging technologies.
Under the reasoning in Clean Flicks, companies such as
CleanFlicks are violating the law, yet if a pay-per-view video-on-
demand company produced edited versions of motion pictures for
a fee and broadcast the films via a streaming video format, they
would not have violated FECA. The film would have been
distributed in a non-fixed format." 3 The minority views of the
Congressional report explicitly identified this shortcoming in the
legislation and the problems that would have remained with the
109. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
110. H.R. REP. No. 109-33(I), at 6 (2005), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.A.A.N. 220, 224.
111. Id. at 6, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 225.
112. Id. at 1, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 220-21.
113. Streaming video is defined as:
[a] one-way video transmission over a data network. It is
widely used on the Web as well as private intranets to deliver
video on-demand or a video broadcast. Unlike movie files
(MPG, AVI, etc.) that are played after they are downloaded,
streaming video is played within a few seconds of requesting
it, and the data is not stored permanently in the computer.
The Free Dictionary, Streaming Video, http://computing-dictionary.
thefreedictionary.com/streaming+video (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
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passage of FECA."' The minority identified one of the Clean
Flicks plaintiffs, ClearPlay, as a beneficiary of FECA and accused
the majority of taking sides by "assisting ClearPlay by
preemptively vitiating [their] legal claim." '15
The employees of ClearPlay view films and, based on their
experiences, create specific software filters that edit out
objectionable content.116 Customers who purchase a specially
designed ClearPlay DVD player can then download these filters.
When active, these filters "make imperceptible" objectionable
content on authorized copies when played."7 When the films are
viewed, a computer program within the DVD player automatically
filters out the objectionable content."8 Under FECA, this type of
alteration is permissible, where the altered films conflict with the
filmmakers' visions, because these alterations are not fixed in a
tangible medium of expression." 9 The "fixed format" argument
advanced by the Clean Flicks court, however, fails to address the
case's central copyright issue of alteration of copyrighted works.
Under FECA, all of the filmmakers' activities, save for the fixation
of the works in a tangible medium, would be legal.
C. Application of the Statutory Test for Fair Use
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court stated that no one
fair use factor wieghs in the balance more heavily than the
others. 2 ° In Campbell, the Court concluded that parody was
protected as fair use because of its important role in social
criticism. 2' In Clean Flicks, CleanFlicks stated that part of the
reason for their manufacturing of edited copies of copyrighted
motion pictures was to draw attention to the need for films without
114. See H.R. REP. No. 109-33(I), at 69-76, as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 220, 232-39.
115. Id. at 70, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 233.
116. Id., 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 233.
117. Id., 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 233.
118. ClearPlay, About ClearPlay, http://www.clearplay.com/about.aspx (last
visited Nov. 1, 2007).
119. See H.R. REP. No. 109-33(I), at 70, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
220, 233.
120. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994).
121. Id. at 592.
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objectionable content. However, the Clean Flicks court felt that
judicial forums were the wrong place to bring such public policy
arguments.' This reasoning goes against the Supreme Court's
fair use doctrine as established in Campbell.
In analyzing the "purpose and character of the use," the
Campbell Court examined the fair use of a song that had been
transformed into an alleged parody sold for commercial gain.' In
holding that parody was protected fair use, the Court used public
policy arguments to justify its holding. 24  In Clean Flicks,
however, the court dismissed CleanFlicks' public policy
arguments and focused exclusively on the commercial aspects of
CleanFlicks' creation and distribution of the edited films.' 5 The
Clean Flicks court was solely concerned with protecting the
creators' rights, regardless of the social relevancy of the nature of
the infringement. As such, the Clean Flicks court blatantly
disregarded the Supreme Court's analytical framework for
considering the first prong for fair use determination.'26 Under the
Campbell Court's analysis, both CleanFlicks' public policy
arguments for its fair use of the filmmakers' works as well as the
commercial benefits gained by CleanFlicks' infringements should
have been considered.
The court also ignored the issue of how free speech concerns
and copyright can be reconciled.'27 Part of CleanFlicks' argument
122. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1240
(D. Colo. 2006).
123. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79.
124. Id. at 584.
125. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
126. Id.
127. 1 NIMMER, supra note 102, § 1.10. Professor Nimmer writes:
It might be contended that copyright laws fall within a built-in
exception to First Amendment protection, not by the words of
the First Amendment, but by reason of another passage of the
Constitution, namely the Copyright Clause, expressly
authorizing Congress to grant to authors "the exclusive right"
to their "writings." However, there are several reasons why
refuge for copyright may not be found in this manner. First, if
a completely literal reading of the First Amendment is to be
made, then we must likewise recognize that the First
Amendment is an amendment, hence superseding anything
inconsistent with it that may be found in the main body of the
360
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was that their appropriation of the filmmakers' works was a
criticism that was meant to bring attention to the need for more
"socially acceptable alternatives" for the works made by the
filmmakers.'28 CleanFlicks' actions could have been considered
free speech because their creation of the edited films was a form of
protesting the absence of alternative versions of films containing
objection content. Previous federal court decisions have protected
such forms of public criticism as justification for the unauthorized
copying of copyrighted work.'29 Nevertheless, the court dismissed
the free speech concerns and focused on its role of protecting "the
creator's rights to protect its creation in the form in which it was
created."' 30
The Clean Flicks court also erred in its analysis of the third
prong of the fair use defense by not following the analytical
framework set forth in the controlling opinion of Campbell.'
Constitution. This, of course, includes the Copyright Clause.
In any event, even were the original Constitution and the Bill
of Rights to be viewed as a single instrument, the Copyright
Clause may not be read as independent of and uncontrolled by
the First Amendment.
Id.
128. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
129. See Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003).
In Chicago Board of Education, the 7th Circuit considered the case of a Chicago
public school teacher names Schmidt who had created unauthorized copies of
standardized test created and copyrighted by the Chicago Board of Education.
Id. at 626-27. Without getting prior permission from the Board, Schmidt
reprinted the tests as part of a newsletter edited by him. Id. at 627. Schmidt's
reasons for the copying was to criticize the tests. Id. In addition to arguing that
his actions were protected under the fair use doctrine, Schmidt argued that his
unauthorized publication was within his First Amendment. Id. at 628. The
court noted that the First Amendment defense "is the point of balance between
the right to criticize, which is one aspect of freedom of expression, and the
incentive to create expressive works, which is another aspect of the same
freedom .... " Id. at 631. Although the 7th Circuit did not find the First
Amendment defense applicable here, the court acknowledged the Supreme
Court's opinion in Eldred v. Ashcroft that "copyright law contains built-in First
Amendment accommodations." Id. (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
219 (2003)).
130. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240-42.
131. Id. The third fair use prong considers the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the whole. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006).
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Under Campbell, inquiries into the third statutory prong for fair
use must "recognize that the extent of permissible copying varies
with the purpose and character of the use."' 32 In Clean Flicks, the
amount and substantiality of the use were not the type that would
deny the filmmakers the financial benefits of exploiting their
ownership of the copyrighted motion pictures. CleanFlicks paid
the filmmakers for each copy of the edited films that CleanFlicks
had in their distribution channels.'33 Furthermore, the films were
edited for financial gain and for the purpose of satisfying a public
need for films edited for content.'34 As with the first prong of the
fair use defense, the third prong calls on the fact-finder to examine
the policy reasons that might militate against excessive use of the
underlying copyrighted materials by the alleged infringer.'35 The
Clean Flicks court, as it did in its analysis for the first prong, never
considered policy reasons for the alleged infringement in the
court's analysis of the third prong.'36
Although the Clean Flicks court failed to use the appropriate
analysis with regard the first and third statutory prongs for fair use,
the court focused on the fourth statutory prong as the true area of
contention.'37 Once again, the court failed to consider the framers'
intent behind the law of copyrights.
The fourth statutory prong considers the "effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."'38 The
Supreme Court's decision in Campbell stated that, in evaluating
whether the use has satisfied this prong, courts should consider
"not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular
actions of the alleged infringer," but also whether the conduct
resulted in a "substantially adverse impact on the potential market
for the original [work]."' 39  However, the Clean Flicks court
disregarded both the analytical framework from the controlling
decision of Campbell as well as the plain language of the statute.
132. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-87 (1994).
133. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
134. Id. at 1239-40.
135. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589.
136. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241.
137. Id. at 1241-42.
138. 17 U.S.C. § 1.07(4) (2006).
139. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
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Rather, it presumed the meaning behind the Act was to protect a
copyright holder's right to control the content of the work.14
This conclusion is inappropriate because the Act lacks any
language supporting this proposition. Only if the filmmakers
could prove that they had or intended to target the market in the
future could they make the argument that they were damaged by
CleanFlicks use of their works. The filmmakers offered no such
proof. CleanFlicks argued instead that their business actually
enhanced the value of the filmmakers' copyrights by providing
extra revenue from a population that would otherwise never have
been exposed to the films.'41
Additionally, although there is a presumption of substantial
market harm where the infringer's use is for commercial gain, such
a presumption in the current case was erroneous. The affected
market was not targeted by the filmmakers. 42 Only in the event
that the filmmakers decided to expand into that market in the
future might CleanFlicks' activities be considered infringing.
However, as the filmmakers were not currently targeting the same
market, the argument that this would harm their future market is
tenuous at best.
Finally, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that
CleanFlicks' use would have affected the filmmakers' future
market for edited works. The filmmakers provided no evidence
that they were either planning on expanding in the market in the
future or losing money because of CleanFlicks targeting of the
underserved target market. Under this line of reasoning,
CleanFlicks satisfied the fourth prong of their fair use defense. In
failing to apply such reasoning, the court ignored the statutory
language and intent of the Act.
V. IMPACT
The Clean Flicks decision will result in a further muddying of
the waters concerning the property rights of the consumer, the
intellectual property rights of copyright owners, and the moral
140. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1242.
141. Id.
142. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451
(1984).
25
Pillai: Mr. Soderbergh Goes to Washington: How Congress and the Clean Fli
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART& ENT. LAW [Vol. XVII:339
rights of the creators of creative works. Because fixation was the
element of the infringement that was deemed most damaging to
the copyright holders, future technologies will build upon the
ClearPlay model, whereby the intellectual property creations of
filmmakers are altered but not fixed, thereby insuring that such
alterations do not run afoul of existing U.S. copyright law.
Furthermore, the creation of this new moral right of film creators
does more than merely expand the rights of the copyright holders:
it infringes upon the property rights of the owners of the
authorized copies of the films. Another possible fallout will be a
chilling effect on the permissible free speech use of protected
works for the purpose of social criticism.
A. Contraction of the Real Property Rights of the Consumer
Under the Copyright Act, an individual who makes infringing
copies of a work infringes on the copyright owner's reproduction
rights even if there is no violation of the copyright owner's
exclusive right of distribution."' This provision is also subject to
the fair use provisions § 107 of the Act, but in the Clean Flicks
court's decision and its interpretation of FECA, fair use does not
appear to be a valid defense. The Clean Flicks court interpreted
FECA as prohibiting any actions resulting in fixed copies of
altered works, even if the works have been created by an
individual who lawfully purchased an authorized copy and created
the altered work for his own private use. 44 This abrogation of the
rights of the property owner for the benefit of the copyright holder
goes against both the framers' intent behind the Copyright Clause
and the protections built into the Copyright Act for fair use. The
framers intented to enhance the dissemination of artistic endeavors
while encouraging the creation of creative expression by
rewarding it by grant of a limited monopoly.'45 Once the purchaser
paid for the authorized copy, the purchaser should be free to treat
143. 8 NIMMER, supra note 102, § 8.02[C].
144. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
145. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975). In
Aiken, the Supreme Court stated that "[c]reative work is to be encouraged and
rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting
broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts." Id at 156.
364
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the copy in whatever fashion he or she chooses, so long as the
treatment does not run afoul of the copyright owner's remaining
rights.
Even where the purchaser has created a copy of the work for his
own use without disseminating the copy to the public, the Clean
Flicks court held that such use would violate FECA even though it
might satisfy all four prongs of the fair use defense. The purpose
and nature of the creation of an altered title for personal use would
be considered non-commercial because the owner would not be
sharing the work with the general public. The nature of the copy
would be a copy of an expressive work, but once again, the copy is
not made for public dissemination but for home viewing. The
amount and substantiality of the portion copied would translate
into most of the film being copied, but the purchaser already paid
for the right to own a copy of the film. Therefore, this factor
would not necessarily be dispositive of a finding of unfair use.
The effect of the use upon the market or value for the original
work would be non-existent because, as stated previously, the
purchaser has already paid the requisite copyright royalty by
purchasing an authorized copy, and the creation of the edited
version would be for the purchaser's private use. Taken together,
it is likely that the purchaser's actions would be considered fair use
under the Copyright Act.
B. Expanding the Copyright Owner's Intellectual Property Rights
and the Creation of a New Moral Right
Once the copyright owner has been granted a royalty for the
copy of the work, the owner does not have the right to dictate how
the purchaser uses the work, so long as the purchaser's use does
not infringe upon the owner's rights. 46 By expanding the rights of
the owner to include control over the purchaser's use of the copy
in the purchaser's home, the court stepped towards a grant of
indefinite copyright for each individual copy and the validation of
FECA's creation of a new moral right for the copyright holders of
films.
Although many countries have long recognized certain non-
146. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 110 (2006).
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economic, or "moral" rights for authors of creative works,
numerous federal and state judicial decisions have suggested that
such moral rights are not recognized in the United States.'47 Only
with the passage of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 did
Congress recognize the moral rights of authors, albeit the rights of
integrity and attribution for visual artists.'48 The moral rights that
are recognized in other countries, such as other Berne Convention
signatory countries, similarly grant such rights to authors engaged
in the fine arts, such as sculpting, painting, photography.
However, those countries have not extended such rights to the
creators of audiovisual works.'49 In light of Congress' long
standing reluctance to recognize moral rights to the extent of the
other Berne signatories, Congress' passage of FECA and the
accompanying grant of a substantive moral right were all the more
shocking. In effect, Congress granted copyright holders the right
to control alterations of their work long after having been paid.
Because there is no economic incentive, the only incentive present
by preventing the creation of a fixed altered work would be non-
economic, or moral, if the Clean Flicks court's interpretation of
FECA is correct.
The intent behind FECA, however, was not to stop the creation
of unauthorized derivative works by purchasers of legally
authorized copies of protected works. The purpose was to prevent
distribution of these unauthorized works. The average consumer
who wishes to make fixed copies of films after having already
edited out objectionable content is an unlikely pirate because their
actions are limited to a single copy for their own use, not for the
purpose of selling illegal copies of the work in violation of the
147. 8 NIMMER, supra note 102, § 8D.02[A].
148. 17 U.S.C. § 301.
149. 8 NIMMER, supra note 102, § 8D.02[B]. The Beme Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works is the oldest continuing copyright
protection international treaty. See The UK Copyright Service,
http://www.copyrightservice.co.uk/copyright/p08_beme-convention (last
visited Nov. 1, 2007). First adopted in Beme Switzerland in 1886, the Berne
Convention attempts to harmonize intellectual property rights world wide by
providing a framework of minimum standards for copyright protection for
authors. Id. The United States joined the Bere Convention in 1989, and under
the Berne Implementation Act of 1988, Congress incorporated Beme by
reference into the Copyright Act. Id.
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rights of the filmmakers. Indeed, the Committee for the
Judiciary's report on FECA expressly states that the primary
reason for the provisions was to cut down on piracy. 5° The
Committee even went so far as to state that FECA was not
granting the filmmakers moral rights, because under the new law,
purchasers were allowed to electronically "make imperceptible
limited portions of work that he or she chooses not to see for
themselves or their family, whether or not the skipped content is
viewed as objectionable by most, many, few, or even one
viewer."'' The Committee failed to realize, however, that by not
allowing purchasers to similarly create fixed copies of the edited
purchasers, FECA granted the directors a narrow exception to the
very same moral rights that the Committee claimed to be denying
them.
With the developing technologies such as video on demand and
streaming video, the Committee's narrow exception may prove to
have a more expansive future effect upon the moral rights enjoyed
by filmmakers. The Clean Flicks court's interpretation of FECA
represents an erosion of the rights of the purchaser of a
copyrighted work and a corresponding increase in the power of the
creator to control his creation outside the bounds of copyright law.
If the purpose of copyright law is to promote public access to
creative works by providing a limited economic monopoly on said
creative works, FECA's apparent grant of copyright law represents
an expansion of the law beyond the bounds of economic reward
and an erosion of statutory fair use.
C. Validation of Other Technologies
The fixation requirement that the Clean Flicks court focused on
does not solve the issue of alteration of the filmmakers' works. If
the filmmakers were truly troubled by the alterations of their
artistic creations, they would have pushed for all technologies that
enable alterations to their works, regardless of fixation, to be
banned. This is not the case. Under the ruling, ClearPlay can
continue to manufacture their DVD players with filtering software
150. H.R. REP. No. 109-33(I), at 2 (2005), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 220, 221.
151. Id. at 6, 2005 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 225.
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so long as the players do not create fixed copies of the films.
Technologies, however, are ever changing and adapting.
Currently, the expansion of digital transmission via streaming
video, video-on-demand, and television providers makes the
court's preoccupation with fixation all the more puzzling. It
remains to be seen whether the law will be changed in the future to
adapt to these changing technologies. For the present, however,
the court validated these other technologies as satisfying the
requirements of copyright law in that they do not create fixed
versions of protected works.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Clean Flicks decision cast a chilling pall on the rights
enjoyed by purchasers of protected material, all while expanding
the rights of filmmakers beyond the boundaries of the established
economic rights of legal copyright holders. Of particular import in
the decision was the court's failure to find nominative fair use
when an analysis of the fair use test, as articulated by the Supreme
Court in Campbell, would suggest that CleanFlicks had met its
burden of proof.
The Clean Flicks court went against the established intent of the
framers of the Constitution. CleanFlicks' actions fulfilled the
underlying public policy of the Copyright Act by insuring that the
filmmakers' works would be disseminated to as broad an audience
as possible. At the same time, CleanFlicks insured that the
filmmakers were rewarded for their limited monopoly in their
works via payments made for each legally obtained copy. If the
Copyright Act is to promote the broad dissemination of artistic
works, then, arguably, CleanFlicks was aiding in the fulfillment of
the framers' intent. Unfortunately, the Clean Flicks court viewed
CleanFlicks actions in a different light.
One of the more troubling aspects of the decision is the court's
dismissal of FECA as inapplicable to the current case on the basis
that the works in Clean Flicks were fixed while the works in
FECA were not. The court missed the fact that FECA expands the
rights of the copyright holder by preventing the purchaser from
making copies of his legally purchased item for personal use or
altering the content in any way if the result will be a fixed form.
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The court also failed to acknowledge the free speech aspects of
CleanFlicks' efforts and their protest against films of objectionable
content. By refusing to recognize the free speech arguments, the
court established a precedent where a party may not claim the fair
use defense even where the party may have been appropriating the
copyrighted material for the purpose of criticism or to instigate
social change.
In answer to the uncertainty surrounding the rights of the
consumer versus the rights of the copyright holder, Congress
should amend FECA to either ban any fixed and unfixed
alterations of audiovisual works, thereby creating a new moral
right on the part of the director, or allow the creation of altered
works in either fixed or unfixed formats. This would recognize the
long established rights of property owners in allowing them to
enjoy their copies as they see fit within the auspices of the fair use
defense. Currently, there is no clear answer as evidenced by the
Clean Flicks court's dismissal of FECA as inapplicable to the case.
The Clean Flicks court also erred in its application of the fair
use test. The purpose and nature of CleanFlicks use could have
been considered a First Amendment exercise of CleanFlicks' right
to protest the lack of available alternatives to the objectionable
versions of the filmmakers works, but the court dismissed this by
saying the courtroom was the wrong forum for these arguments.
The problem with the opinion is that the court never specifies
which forum is proper for bringing a cause of action for an alleged
First Amendment violation.
The court also failed to recognize that the amount and
substantiality of CleanFlicks' use was not of the type that would
inhibit the filmmakers from financially benefiting from their
works. Under this reasoning, CleanFlicks satisfied the third prong
of the fair use defense, but the court dismissed this argument and
read the application strictly without consideration of the public
policy. This was in direct opposition to the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Campbell, where the Court stated that the fact finder
should examine public policy concerns that might permit excessive
use of copyrighted materials. 5 '
The court also failed in its analysis of the fourth prong of the fair
152. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 589 (1994).
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use defense because the filmmakers could not point to any
evidence that suggested the present or future markets for their
works were harmed. In fact, CleanFlicks argued that the value was
enhanced because of the introduction of the works to a new
audience. In failing to consider this argument, the court allowed
the filmmakers to reap the benefits of CleanFlicks' work without
recognizing that CleanFlicks had not demonstrably affected the
current and future market for the filmmakers' works.
In this age of digital media, the Clean Flicks decision created
more issues than it answered. The lines between permissible fair
use for personal and professional uses has been blurred, and this
line was further blurred by the passage of FECA. The Clean
Flicks court had the opportunity to interpret the manipulation and
sale of copyrighted digital medium in this case of first impression,
but it failed to do so. The long-term effect of this decision will be
continued confusion over the property rights of consumers versus
those of the nation's media conglomerates. In this dawn of the age
of digital media, this case is the first of many yet to come.
Suresh Pillai
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